Calibrating China Ties - Indonesia

Interactive Transcript

spk_0 From Carnegie China, this is China and the world.

spk_0 Engaging leading scholars and former policymakers on China's foreign policy and evolving global

spk_0 role brought to you by the East Asia-based Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International

spk_0 Peace.

spk_0 Welcome to this season of Carnegie China's China and the World Podcast, where we will

spk_0 be exploring how states in East Asia manage their multifaceted security and economic concerns

spk_0 as they engage with the peoples of public China.

spk_0 My name is Ian Chong, I'm a non-resident scholar with Carnegie China and an associate professor

spk_0 of political science at the National University of Singapore.

spk_0 Today, we're going to take a deep dive looking at how Indonesia handles its multifaceted

spk_0 security and economic relations with the peoples of public China.

spk_0 With me today, Johannes Salimon, who's associate professor in international relations at

spk_0 Universitas General Akmanyanee, Indonesia, and a non-resident fellow with the National Bureau

spk_0 of Asia and Research.

spk_0 And also, we have Natalie Sambi, who is founded and executive director of research and

spk_0 independent think tank focus on military and societies in Southeast Asia.

spk_0 She's also senior policy fellow at Asia Society Australia and a non-resident fellow with a

spk_0 Brookings institution.

spk_0 Natalie also teaches with the Australian War College.

spk_0 We'll start by talking about the really big picture because not all listeners are going to be

spk_0 familiar with Indonesia's ties with China.

spk_0 So how would you describe Indonesia's economic relationship with the PRC?

spk_0 Well, basically, the relationship has been getting strong in the past,

spk_0 when 10 to 20 years, especially after Indonesia reopened diplomatically since we China back in the 1990s.

spk_0 And then since then, Indonesia has been doing a lot of business with China.

spk_0 China has been also sending spotting a lot of things and then investment in Indonesia,

spk_0 such as the infamous HESP trail from Jakarta to Bandung.

spk_0 And basically, the ties getting stronger.

spk_0 Although one thing that we have to be very careful here is,

spk_0 I don't know whether this is the time to say this, but

spk_0 one thing that we have to be also worried is like,

spk_0 while the relationship between Indonesia and China has been improving and has been increasing

spk_0 in the past couple of years. But I believe Japan is one of the largest investment also,

spk_0 invests also a dependent state and other action countries, especially Singapore.

spk_0 Yeah, I mean, I was looking at this and I think there is a sense of two-way dependence,

spk_0 but that's not an even one. It's definitely tipped in favor of China.

spk_0 You know, it is Indonesia's largest trading partner, but I think Indonesia and China offer

spk_0 things that the other needs. Indonesia needs a vast amount of investment. It needs the technology

spk_0 in minerals processing while China needs a market. So it needs places to invest, it needs to

spk_0 generate that kind of economic activity. It needs to redirect its infrastructure and manufacturing

spk_0 markets to find consumers. And the Indonesian middle class, even though it's shrinking,

spk_0 it still represents an immense market for Chinese goods, which comprise a large number of the

spk_0 imports as well. So there is a lot of complementarity there and evidently a lot of potential as well.

spk_0 There's so much that Indonesia and China are doing together, particularly not just in the

spk_0 critical mineral space, but also in terms of electronics as well with China making inroads

spk_0 into Indonesia's telecommunications market as well. So lots of really interesting points of

spk_0 intersection between China and Indonesia economically. And I'm sure we're going to unpack how those

spk_0 will intersect with the potential entanglements, but there's definitely a sense that these two

spk_0 countries as their economies grow, as their relative power in the Indo-Pacific shifts that economic

spk_0 relationship is going to form a really important pillar as well. I just want to add one last thing,

spk_0 and that's when you look at the joint statement between China and Indonesia that was released at

spk_0 the end of last year when President Prabhu and to visit Beijing in the title itself is this idea of

spk_0 shared future. And I think when you think about the economic relationship as playing into this narrative

spk_0 of a shared future between Indonesia and China, you start to see how important it is.

spk_0 One of the things about Indonesia becoming a market for the RC goods, I mean, with the first round

spk_0 of the trade war, and possibly with the subsequent round as well, there's been trade diversion.

spk_0 So goods that have formally been going to places like the United States have been coming to places

spk_0 like Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, that have been complaints about overcapacity.

spk_0 What do you two make of this?

spk_0 Well, I mean, it is a really issue. China has been flooding Indonesia because of its manufactured goods

spk_0 from textile to ceramics and anything under the side of the ship. And that creates a huge club

spk_0 here and the price basically dropping, and a lot of factories in Indonesia close down,

spk_0 I mean, I mean, I have a colleague that has a lot of clothing stores and basically he said that

spk_0 he has to close like, I don't know, like two-thirds of them because he, because they cannot just

spk_0 compete against the Chinese exports. I mean, let me make Indonesia, let's say the cost of

spk_0 like, let's say manufacturing one piece of clothing is let's say around, I mean, this is just a

spk_0 pocketbook, like let's say like $2 Singaporean, like, but China can come and say, yeah, we are going

spk_0 to sell you for $1 piece and you know, and the factories say, we cannot compete with them.

spk_0 And why is that? Well, of course, I mean, on one hand, China does have economic scale that,

spk_0 you know, it has bigger factories, it's mechanized and so can produce faster than

spk_0 than in Indonesia. But at the same time, China also has a lot of subsidized for their manufacturing

spk_0 business and this is basically killing Indonesian factories. Given that, how does it

spk_0 is here to protect itself? Well, for Indonesia, now we already put some sort of

spk_0 tariff, like Berrier saying that, look, we are not allowing Chinese, trying to just dump all their

spk_0 clothing here, so they are quotas. But the problem is people asking like, why now? Why

spk_0 don't you, why didn't you do it last year doing the election? Of course, I mean, the

spk_0 agreed thought is that those importers are paying a lot of money, contribute a lot of money to

spk_0 the political parties. So, I mean, of course, after the elections, then the government's, hey,

spk_0 yeah, yeah, it's a bad, it is really, really, you know, bad ideas. So we kind of shut the

spk_0 the importer. But they already got, you already lost several factories, I mean, even the

spk_0 biggest factory in Indonesia is getting already close down. The other thing that's really,

spk_0 that's pretty big is China's involvement, all this extraction of minerals from Indonesia,

spk_0 which is having a big positive economic impact, apart from the sort of overall aggregate effects,

spk_0 you know, on for local communities, that seems to be creating a lot of pollution, it seems

spk_0 to be creating a little bit of, you know, unease locally. Do you see any of that naturally? This,

spk_0 of course, gets into some of the economic security issues. Absolutely. And this is a bit of a

spk_0 thorny issue. You know, I'm going to defer for a statistic here for a second that, you know,

spk_0 while a lot of Southeast Asian states, including, if not all Southeast Asian states, including

spk_0 Indonesia, see China as the most influential economic power. And that's according to the latest

spk_0 state of Southeast Asia report by our colleagues at ISAS Institute. But when we drill down, you know,

spk_0 yes, it's the most influential economic power. But in Indonesia, 58.9% of respondents were more

spk_0 worried about that Chinese economic influence in their country, other than being welcoming of that.

spk_0 So you exactly, you point out to that double-edged sword where you've got masses of Chinese

spk_0 investment in nickel processing plants, 90% of infrastructure, nickel processing infrastructure

spk_0 is owned by Chinese companies. But at the same time, you've got dilaterias and environmental

spk_0 practices that are leaching awful chemicals into the water system and poisoning the local

spk_0 communities amongst other things. So there is, irresponsibility, obviously, on behalf of the Chinese

spk_0 companies, but that lies at the feet of the Indonesian government to make sure that it's

spk_0 environmental law protection infrastructories were a bus that it will actually enforce some of that.

spk_0 And that gets into a tricky thing of not wanting to alienate your purse, but at the same time,

spk_0 wanting to reap benefits of that. So I think there has to be some hard questions asked about to

spk_0 what extent is the Indonesian government prepared to enforce some of those environmental protections

spk_0 and continue to enjoy the benefits of having that investment, which will certainly help in

spk_0 Indonesia elevate itself within global supply chains for electrobatic electric vehicle battery

spk_0 production, which will be critical. So again, we've got to ask where that's going to go. I mean,

spk_0 we've had explosions in the past at different processing plants. So there are questions there about

spk_0 safe practices for workers. We've talked about the economic relationship between Indonesia and the

spk_0 PRC, but there are also security concerns, not just the sort of historical concerns that continue to

spk_0 exist, you know, suspicion of communism and so on. However, maybe there's a territory of the

spk_0 dispute, maybe there isn't a territory of the dispute, but at least north of the Natuunas,

spk_0 we've had standoffs before between PRC vessels, government vessels, and also Indonesian

spk_0 become a lot that's Indonesian coast guard vessels. What do you make of this, Johannes?

spk_0 Well, basically, I mean, there has already been standoff for the past couple of years, even during

spk_0 the Udo Ngo era, back in 2010, I believe they already back, they have already been like, actually

spk_0 some minor standoff although not as big as what happened in 2006. And I believe that led Jokowi to

spk_0 to head his, his cabinet meeting on the warship in Natuunas area. So it is actually nothing really

spk_0 new, but the Indonesian government has been trying to kind of don't pay the attention because it

spk_0 cannot afford to lose the commiculations and it also are kind of thinking that there's no way it

spk_0 can win if we end up in engaging in an open conflict. So this kind of sad, in more opinion,

spk_0 that's kind of feeling, but that's the opinion, basically. But that's what I get from the people

spk_0 that spoke to, basically just want to don't play it. But yeah, and so yes, there are conflicts and

spk_0 they don't like it. They don't like the channel has been too aggressive. But the problem is,

spk_0 they have to maintain economic relations. And as as Napa Ali earlier mentioned about the

spk_0 the joint statement with Indonesia, that was actually quite from the original actually because

spk_0 there, what happened is that China basically forced a sentence saying that look, we are going to

spk_0 cooperate in the disputed area, but for Indonesia, for policy, this is a maker, I mean, I like the

spk_0 from the comment law, they said that look, we never admit that there is a dispute because we never,

spk_0 because we never, we never acknowledge China, China and that's like playing.

spk_0 So as a result, because we cannot really fight them, we just simply ignore them and

spk_0 Bobo with the joint statement, basically just ignore the precedents.

spk_0 Right. So this is something I like to follow up on because there's some confusion here.

spk_0 Now in the probo statement in Beijing, he basically said that he would

spk_0 shelve the dispute and have joint development. But the Indonesian long standing position is that

spk_0 there is no dispute. So what's the current policy? Is there a dispute or isn't there a dispute?

spk_0 Because if there isn't a dispute, you can't possibly shelve a dispute.

spk_0 Well, I call it the Shoddingerphone Policy. Now I think what happened is like

spk_0 Bobo and his cabinet realized that it is a blunder. So they ended up like ignoring it. I mean,

spk_0 I haven't heard anything being mentioned or being said about the joint statement. And nobody

spk_0 actually ever mentioned it again. That's my feeling. They just ignore it. They make it like a Shoddinger

spk_0 Natuna, I guess. Natalie, what are your thoughts? Is there a dispute? Isn't there a dispute?

spk_0 Highly appropriate for a president that loves cats. Look, I think we have to point out the fact

spk_0 that whether publicly it's acknowledged as an issue, again, I'm going to defer to our

spk_0 illustrious colleagues who produce the Southeast Asian report. When it comes to the South China

spk_0 Sea, China's encroachment is the top concern for Indonesia. So it is something that's being looked

spk_0 out. But as your hunters pointed out, it's not always consistent the extent to which an

spk_0 Indonesian president will make a public deal out of this because as your hunters pointed out,

spk_0 that tension between wanting to keep good diplomatic ties, but at the same time maintaining

spk_0 sovereignty. Like there are two major issues here. You know, the sovereignty issue is paramount

spk_0 and food security. But going back to your idea of what's going on? What's the ambiguity? Is there

spk_0 a change in policy? The joint statement says something, something new, which is that there's

spk_0 acknowledgement overlapping claim. Indonesia's long standing position is that there is no claim.

spk_0 It's an orphanage in a sea. It's Indonesia's easet. We don't need to talk about it. So we're not

spk_0 even going to acknowledge things like negotiations. Right? So the Indonesian Foreign Minister

spk_0 Kim Lew had to come out after with an issue that statement clarifying. So the last official position

spk_0 on it is that unclose, the arbitra ruling in 2016, which found China's nine dash lines

spk_0 claims to be illegal is what stands. And then Indonesia will continue to negotiate within the framework

spk_0 of unclose. So that's where we're at right now. But I do want to point out actually there was a really

spk_0 good strategist article by a friend, Aristide Damo one, in which he says this idea of strategic

spk_0 ambiguity is if it's not something that Prabowo is doing deliberately, it's something that one

spk_0 can observe. That this is ambiguity of statements, you know, in a number of areas,

spk_0 particularly in such honesty. And he says, look, you know, to just make things clear,

spk_0 Prabowo, and I should quote him, Prabo should rescind the recognition of the overlapping claim with

spk_0 China, as well as any commitment to the joint development of the era with Beijing, because this

spk_0 ambiguity is causing problems for Indonesia's negotiations with the Vietnam. It also puts pressure

spk_0 on other ASEAN states as they're trying to negotiate the code of conducts of Indonesia's

spk_0 position on this is not necessarily consistent with the Philippines. So there are second order ramifications

spk_0 of this strategic ambiguity that have stemmed from this joint statement, such honesty.

spk_0 If I'm add something, and I agree with what Natalie said, and I also agree with the fact that

spk_0 this ambiguity actually hurt Indonesia position way more, I mean, it is something that Prabowo

spk_0 doesn't really like, because it is basically an other sort of a shoulder, I mean, it is just a

spk_0 like, you know, it is just a politically suicide for him to maintain this, but at the same time,

spk_0 he is like running in the idea of like, look, I am the, I mean, the president, you know,

spk_0 the president that Indonesia deserves, like, I'm like this big guy, this song guy,

spk_0 and of course, the last thing that he wants to do is to admit like, look, I'm going to hear him saying,

spk_0 like, look, I'm going, I'm screwing up, I mean, if you, because if he's capable of saying that,

spk_0 I mean, there are a lot of things that has been doing in the past, he has been doing for the

spk_0 past couple of months, and that I think he should just say, look, forget this ice scuba,

spk_0 but he didn't, and so unfortunately, I don't think he will, he will apologize and say, or say,

spk_0 I take it back, I mean, unfortunately. Right, so since we're on the South China Sea,

spk_0 I'm going to push our composition a little bit further in that direction. So, Indonesia,

spk_0 acupunylic state maritime nation, if you know, things get

spk_0 testy in the South China Sea, you know, clearly it would affect Indonesia's sea lanes of communication,

spk_0 that those sea lanes which are used as the trade, it's telecommunications and the name,

spk_0 and the shape of undersea cables could become under jeopardy, combatant vessels or supplies for

spk_0 combatants may decide to, you know, go through Indonesian waters. How does Indonesia's sea,

spk_0 you know, the risk that is present with the South China Sea disputes, and how does it try to manage it?

spk_0 Well, by saying in Shia, I guess. Well, that's seriously, I mean, there's something that many

spk_0 people Indonesia just prefer not to think about, but as far as I know though, I mean, if we go

spk_0 to shooting war in South China Sea, because of anything like Taiwan or something stupid happening

spk_0 in Scarborough, sure, while Indonesian first policy is to declare that we are non-combatant. We

spk_0 don't, we are not going to be involved in these crises. We are not to be involved in the conflict,

spk_0 so we just shab our entire waterway. Well, that's basically the unofficial plan that I've been looking

spk_0 for the past couple of years, basically, so we just shab it down. But of course, I think, I can

spk_0 predict what's your next question like, what if United States say, look, screw it, and then we just,

spk_0 and then just tend to pay those first-feet ahead and just poke it. Well, basically,

spk_0 in from Indonesia, yes, there's always the possibility, but the question is whether you can

spk_0 fight United States or Australia. And of course, what we end up doing is that, yeah, we know that

spk_0 you are going to pass it, but we will pretend you are not going to do it. And so basically,

spk_0 it is like if you don't see it, then it won't happen.

spk_0 Want more on China's economic trajectory? China's reform imperative examines China's

spk_0 economic reforms and their impacts on the global economy. Curated by Carnegie China's

spk_0 senior fellow Michael Pettis, China's reform imperative will focus on China's reform progress

spk_0 and on the challenges and opportunities Beijing faces along the way. Go to carnikeandowment.org-china-reform-imperative

spk_0 for more information. Well, actually, you predicted my question slightly wrongly. I was, uh,

spk_0 but I'll throw it out there anyway. I'll let that legal question then you can go. And it's this. So

spk_0 in Indonesia, you know, if it says, okay, things get hot in the South China Sierra on time one,

spk_0 it's going to be really terrible. We want to be a non-combatant. But is it trying to do anything

spk_0 in terms of conflict prevention? Look, in terms of conflict prevention, I'm going to have to give

spk_0 the really bland answer. I mean, I agree with Johannes. I mean, Indonesia's first instinct will be

spk_0 to declare itself a non-combatant. But in terms of conflict prevention, you know, the really

spk_0 bland answer is that Indonesia will defer to ASEAN and try to work things through in terms of

spk_0 management. We know how effective that is and then, you know, my implication is not. But that is

spk_0 somehow going to be the diplomatic front page of what Indonesia will do. I mean, that's not to say

spk_0 Indonesia's diplomats won't go into overdrive and try and manage this. But there is a lot that

spk_0 Indonesia does in terms of posturing itself with its physical assets in terms of conflict prevention.

spk_0 That's, yeah, I'll interested to hear what Johannes has to say. Yeah, I agree with what my policy

spk_0 said. Although, I think I find it very ironic because for the past independent, but because this

spk_0 administration and the previous one in Joko in Pablo basically simply ignores ASEAN.

spk_0 A back then, Pablo said that, look, we don't care about ASEAN. I mean, he's for a

spk_0 minister. He didn't have time with the four minister meetings of ASEAN. And then suddenly,

spk_0 during conflict, he said, oh, yeah, we are going to use ASEAN. I mean, I don't think so,

spk_0 and what do you mean? Well, of course, I mean, this is we have a president's kind of saying,

spk_0 trying to be kind of in like superhero, whatever. So my god, I mean, I'm not going to say that

spk_0 you are wrong, because that's my instinct in normal times. That would be my instinct. That's

spk_0 what we thought what we're going to do. But I think Pablo will try to put a thumb basically. He

spk_0 will say, yeah, I'm going to go to Beijing and you know, and try to make them agree on something,

spk_0 like to refuse the situation or whatever. But that is the day, the question is whether they are

spk_0 going to listen to Pablo and I don't think so. That's a fair point. I think Prabowo will

spk_0 probably try that if you look at what he said about Ukraine and Russia. But actually, I just

spk_0 want to point out just one fact. I was looking up all of Prabowo's international trips since he

spk_0 became president even before. But certainly since he became president, has visited all of the major

spk_0 countries, even gone, you know, dropped into the UK on the way back from the US after he'd gone to

spk_0 China. But other than Malaysia, which is the current Asian chair, it took him at least six months

spk_0 to go to another Southeast Asian country. And they're just in the region. So, you know, I agree with

spk_0 Johannes in terms of signaling how important those relationships that Indonesia has with its fellow

spk_0 Asian neighbors. Not sure. He's definitely signaling that he wants to play with the with the big boys,

spk_0 which lets admit most of them are, you know, with the other leaders that occupy bigger international

spk_0 for that have a larger profile who speak loudly and carry big sticks. We also know that Indonesia has

spk_0 on the book something like 600,000 citizens in Taiwan. After books, that could be even more. So,

spk_0 if we do have a really tense situation or perhaps even a conflict situation located around Taiwan,

spk_0 Indonesia citizens will get directly affected. What's the thinking on that? As far as I know, if there's

spk_0 a conflict, our first instinct is to ask those countries to have a ceasefire so we can pull our

spk_0 citizens out. That's what we are going to first do first. And then we just say that we are

spk_0 non-comactant and please Taiwan, I mean allow us to go or to send our navy there to pick our

spk_0 soldiers and to pick our citizens and basically we don't know to get involved. And of course,

spk_0 the problem is I don't think Taiwan will allow it because for them it will be much better for them

spk_0 to have some sort of like hostage. I mean, you have like one million in Indonesia there in Taiwan.

spk_0 And let's say if China is willing to bomb them all to Kingdom come, so they will be like huge

spk_0 nothing less than that. Back class in Indonesia. I think that's what I predict will happen.

spk_0 I think the plan is kind of unrealistic anyway from a new perspective. I mean, because Indonesia is

spk_0 going to go to Beijing and say, yeah, China, I want humanitarian corridor to go to Taiwan.

spk_0 And of course, I mean, for China, we say, yeah, yeah, let's do it in Taiwan. So we can use it

spk_0 to invade Taiwan. And of course, Taiwan is not that stupid. So most of the plan that I saw

spk_0 seems to be like based on the visual thinking or more I already said earlier like in China.

spk_0 Which is kind of like, I don't know, not a good way to make to make a consistency plan. But

spk_0 the problem is there's no easy answer, especially if you are if your foreign policy is based on the

spk_0 idea that you are always trying to sit aside conflict. I mean, that you don't want to get

spk_0 involved in conflict. You want to get us kind of avoided. And you know, and that's a very

spk_0 limit to what you can do. Yeah, look ahead to Pylon here. But you know, my colleague,

spk_0 Big Tron and I have been doing research about factors shaping Southeast Asia's conflict decision

spk_0 making, if they were armed conflict between the US and China. And of course, this came up. This idea,

spk_0 well, what does Indonesia do with its summer? As you say, half a million, potentially up to a million

spk_0 citizens who are living and working in Taiwan. And the respondents that we had, they just said,

spk_0 there is no plan. And if there is logistically, how are you going to do it? When in

spk_0 Indonesia and the past has had to evacuate several thousand of its citizens in other potential

spk_0 conflict zones or where things have heated up, potentially around Sudan or around Syria,

spk_0 they've done that again, several thousand using other neighboring countries that have been

spk_0 friendly, who have allowed their airports to be used. How is that going to work with Taiwan?

spk_0 How are you going to have the volume of planes to have this evacuation effectively? And

spk_0 interestingly enough, as you're honest pointed out, I mean, the first thing Indonesia is going to have

spk_0 to do, it's going to have to have good relations with China in that moment. It is going to need

spk_0 China's assistance. So it's going to need assistance from Japan, suppose you need to

spk_0 have assistance from the Philippines. So I'm not sure how the logistics of this

spk_0 are going to work, but the respondents who we spoke to in January, February, just, yeah, it

spk_0 looked like it could be a bit of a very sad humanitarian cluster fog. It wouldn't work for you.

spk_0 Yeah, but they're going to have to try, right? That's the point.

spk_0 Yeah, I mean, I mean, I've already saw several plans that say, like assuming that the Philippines

spk_0 willing to be our transit port, like, yeah, yeah, exactly. But the problem is, if you have

spk_0 shooting war in South China, I mean, the Philippines will already be on the United States and

spk_0 Taiwan side. So it's kind of so, I mean, so basically, and I don't think the Philippines will say,

spk_0 yeah, yeah, we agree. Let's bring all those one million people refugees to Philippines and then just

spk_0 just let me just clog our, I mean, our sea lines, clog our ships that we can't use to have Taiwan,

spk_0 I mean, I don't think so. Actually, you bring up a good point about, I mean, this is a sad point,

spk_0 but the fact that they could potentially be hostages, people kept hostage in Taiwan. It could

spk_0 be used the other way by China. You know, I want to flip it back to the point where we talked about

spk_0 shutting down sea lanes. You know, one of our respondents said, look, if Indonesia wants to just be

spk_0 neutral and leave the situation if it leaves, the sea lanes open, that could be interpreted as

spk_0 assisting the United States and its allies by letting the maritime and air passage through.

spk_0 If they shut down the sea lanes, it's seen as interpreted as assisting China, rather than not

spk_0 wanting any combatants. You know, it's Indonesia's damned if you do damned if you don't. But the extent

spk_0 to which those citizens in Taiwan can be used as leverage by other ones, I'd say, okay, Indonesia,

spk_0 if you do close your sea lanes, you don't, you know, this is potentially the outcome for the hostages,

spk_0 that's something I probably hadn't thought of until just now. But I think that's probably

spk_0 something that we ought to think much more closely. How much those two issues be linked.

spk_0 All right. So we've gone through a lot of the security issues. We started with the economic

spk_0 stuff. Now, let's try to draw the two together. From your sense, right? What's the first

spk_0 principles in Jakarta about how to manage these Dijkse security issues alongside the need to work

spk_0 economically with Beijing? So look, I think the instinct in Indonesia is to manage this behind closed

spk_0 doors. It will definitely have to be something that comes with the diplomacy first and foremost.

spk_0 But, you know, as Johanna said, we've got a highly, highly centralized government right now,

spk_0 a leadership under Prabowo. So I would be looking to say, well, what's Prabowo going to do is

spk_0 you're going to take that matter into his own hands. Is he going to issue a firm statement or not

spk_0 if he's something to do with sovereignty or bearing in mind that his legacy will also be predicated

spk_0 on the extent to which he can get a lot of these promises up off the ground in terms of improving

spk_0 the life's Indonesian. So he is obviously in a bit of a bind there. So it hard to say exactly,

spk_0 but I think the considerations will be for Prabowo, in particular, someone who has a very strong

spk_0 sense of self. Let me put that politely. We'll be thinking about, well, you know, okay, five years

spk_0 from now, huh? Am I going to pay for this? Or at the same time, bearing in mind that he has a very

spk_0 explosive personality, he may say something that then just ignites a tinderbox and then that can

spk_0 cause new issues. So we've got a couple of options there, but I think, you know, without getting out

spk_0 crystal ball, those are the considerations I put on the table. That's how Indonesia's going to

spk_0 balance this. A, not easy and be with a president who is unpredictable. Well, I forgot who I heard

spk_0 this from a while ago, but there was somebody who basically complained that, look, Prabowo governed

spk_0 like his campaigning. I mean, he really need to stop campaigning and stop really governing.

spk_0 There is a disconnection between what Prabowo can and what he promised. And like you said,

spk_0 I mean, how he's going to deal with conflict. And I think he said that, yeah, we are big,

spk_0 we're big power. Everybody needs us. We, everybody just have to go through Jakarta to get things

spk_0 that. But again, I mean, that's, that's the problem. He talks big, but, you know, the problem is,

spk_0 we don't really have the capability to do so. How has Indonesia's efforts to manage its

spk_0 security and economic ties with Beijing changed over time? So Prabowo is, of course, the latest in

spk_0 that trajectory. But how do you see that trajectory? How are you describing? Well, during you,

spk_0 you know, era, and they said, well, before, even before you do, you know, era, we make a

spk_0 waltz and, you know, and happy. I think we have, there's not China is not really seen as a

spk_0 much as a security threat, as far as the normalization, nobody's really think China as a threat anymore,

spk_0 except some part of the military. So, I mean, so, so, so the feeling Indonesia is that,

spk_0 look, China is a big, it's a big power. And then it is going to be, it is going to be successful

spk_0 in the future. So we really need to be on the, on the good side and beside, we really need to

spk_0 have balancing the United States. That's the feeling in Jakarta. And the problem is after China's

spk_0 getting aggressive after Hoot Ching Tao and then, and then Xi Jinping getting aggressive in South

spk_0 China, see, then you have got to change in calculation. Remember what happened in 2012,

spk_0 where the Philippines said that we want to put South China city field in ASEAN during

spk_0 communique and then Cambodia just ignored it and it just created and it we came the first time ASEAN

spk_0 almost pick up the first time ASEAN didn't have joint communique. And I think that's kind of the

spk_0 start of like the feeling like look, China can be a problem. So there is always this kind of feeling

spk_0 that that we need China, but at the same time we have to be worried about China. And that's my feeling,

spk_0 that's one of the main reasons why the military connection with China is not as strong as between

spk_0 Indonesia and Indonesia or Australia. Again, I go back to that description as a double-edged

spk_0 sword for Indonesia in its relationship with China. And I think you've got to take into account

spk_0 when you look over the last couple of decades, there's a generational shift about how young people

spk_0 look at China as well. This is a generation that's dealt with Ali Baba and Tencent and TikTok and

spk_0 has had Huawei phones and ZTE. So there's a different understanding of what China means

spk_0 as the United States has influenced so-so shifts, you know, particularly amongst Muslim

spk_0 majority countries in Southeast Asia. So I think that is the some of the social political context as

spk_0 well that Prabhau can lean on. But you know, as Johannes mentioned, China is a permanent feature of

spk_0 the Indo-Pacific region. Its power cannot be ignored. Its economic opportunity can't be turned

spk_0 away from. But that doesn't mean that countries in the region are 100% okay with this bigger,

spk_0 richer, stronger partner. So yes, there is a recognition that that is a risk. But at the same time,

spk_0 Prabhau is sort of marching ahead first into this relationship with China, the other elements of

spk_0 the joint statement that I think are worth pointing out is that Indonesia also recognized China's

spk_0 Global Security Initiative and its Global Civilization Initiative has never done that before.

spk_0 So and then we had the first two plus two that was set up, you know, the Indonesia China two plus two.

spk_0 Okay, maybe no big announced no deliverables from that. But again, these are all small data points

spk_0 when you look at their sort of up to trajectory. Again, with that underlying anxiety, but it's dealing

spk_0 with, you know, playing the ball where it lies. China is the ball. It's there. It's not going

spk_0 anywhere. Share with us what your senses of what the next things on the horizon are for

spk_0 Indonesia's ties with the PRC? Well, I think in the long run, the reason Jakarta is that things may

spk_0 stay the same. I mean, China may be kind of provocative, but not that to aggressive, that, you know,

spk_0 that they will like some, like some, some, some calm head in Beijing that cannot stop all the,

spk_0 mean, all the crazy war talk before it had months. And because for Indonesia, what it really doesn't

spk_0 want is to get to get dragged into conflict between China. So the hope is that look, even if there's

spk_0 a conflict, it can be, hopefully it will be minimized. And I think we really need to start

spk_0 repeating what like we've really been thinking in the past couple of years about like,

spk_0 like, security, especially because China also becoming more aggressive. But at the same time, though, I mean,

spk_0 I mean, I mean, I'm contradicting myself here. And because

spk_0 I'm not saying I'm unable to find, you know, to kind of, you know, to make my mind also because,

spk_0 you know, with coming to White House, at the same time, China seems to also try to find allies that

spk_0 it can work with to the United States. I mean, I believe a city thing basically taught us and

spk_0 leaders that, you know, I mean, why don't, why don't we work together to fight American

spk_0 pirates? So, so rather than all of you that fight in them alone, and let's ask, we've been together,

spk_0 we just kind of, you know, surprising if you think about China's policy. China's, yeah, I mean,

spk_0 China can basically use, can use Trump to mobilize Southeast Asian countries against the United

spk_0 States. And that may be something that we may have to think about. If Trump really starts

spk_0 focusing back to Southeast Asian, something that maybe I need to jack up the time for a while.

spk_0 Yeah, look, yeah, Hannah Springs up a lot of really good points. It just got me thinking, you know,

spk_0 I was saying earlier that China is a major player in, in the end of Pacific, but it's not the only player,

spk_0 you know, it's a big game, but not the only game. And Indonesia is looking to join the OECD.

spk_0 It's looking to show up its relationships in the Middle East with the UK recently signed a

spk_0 partnership, you know, Prabowo and when he visited Kierstama, looking to build up those ties with

spk_0 Russia, ties with India, and then as we know, when President Macron visits the Southeast Asia for

spk_0 the Shagrilla dialogue, he will make a trip to Indonesia and Vietnam. So, you know, I would look at

spk_0 Indonesia's relationship with China in this sort of global context of how else this Indonesia

spk_0 going to manage its relationship, not just with China bilaterally, but as part of a sweeter relationship,

spk_0 said it's going to have to have if it's going to be able to be resilient with the potential, you

spk_0 know, effects of the trade war, but also then mitigating its dependency on China. So I think that's

spk_0 probably something that's already had an injection of energy under Prabowo thus far. And I don't

spk_0 see that changing, but look as far as as Indonesia is concerned China is, you know, going back to what

spk_0 I said earlier, it is still a big game. And that mitigation between balancing security and economics

spk_0 is going to be challenging from this point there on. So how do these different elements get

spk_0 reconciled in Jakarta? I think you are giving Indonesia this is bigger too much credit if you

spk_0 think that they are going to consent this. But to answer your question, I think what they tried to

spk_0 do is basically just like I said earlier, I mean, they just don't want if there's a conflict to

spk_0 go to, to explode, to explode, to explode, to blow to far, so they try to come in because

spk_0 there's just no worst scenario being planned in Jakarta. I mean, there's a problem here. I mean,

spk_0 and everybody think that, you know, I mean, peace will continue. Indonesia will have a good

spk_0 relationship with China. We need China. We need the investment although China is made, although

spk_0 we also need the American investment, definitely. So it's come up the same thing. I mean, I haven't

spk_0 heard any new thinking in Indonesia and foreign policy. And then I don't know like 24 years.

spk_0 Yeah, look, I'm kind of with Johannes on this, you know, your question is how do they reconcile

spk_0 of this? They don't, they don't. Even if there was fresh thinking about China within

spk_0 Camelow or within ThingTang, so on, to what extent is Prabal going to take? He'd of that. He's

spk_0 got his inner circle. He's got his advisors, how he's got his own way of doing things. So even

spk_0 if that fresh thinking somehow makes its way up to his desk, I'm not confident that he's going

spk_0 to take that on board. Indonesia doesn't have a China strategy. It does have ambitions and it has

spk_0 a grand strategy about things that it needs to pursue either as part of Indonesia, Emma, in terms

spk_0 of Prabal's goal of 8% economic growth. That's the stuff that is occupying the executive's mind.

spk_0 There's certainly that branch of the Indonesian state. And the rest of the Indonesian state is

spk_0 busy trying to make sure that all of those other goals, those material goals that raise

spk_0 us down in Indonesia's living are tended to. There isn't a lot of bandwidth left for the big picture

spk_0 strategic thinking. It's not to say that it doesn't happen in the country, but there are so many

spk_0 other challenges that need to be met that, you know, Johannes is right. Like we're just going to

spk_0 do business as usual until we don't have to because we need to get those things done.

spk_0 On that very sober note, I'd like to thank both of you for being on this podcast. Thank you so

spk_0 much, Johannes. Thank you Natalie. Thanks so much and thanks Johannes. Thank you. I mean, let's be there.

spk_0 Thank you for listening to the China and the world podcast, a production of Carnegie China,

spk_0 the East Asia-based Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

spk_0 Views expressed are those of the host and guest panelists, and not necessarily those of Carnegie

spk_0 China or the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Subscribe to the China and the world podcast

spk_0 on popular podcast platforms such as iTunes, Stitcher, or wherever you listen to podcasts.

spk_0 Learn more about Carnegie China at CarnegieChina.org. Tim Martin is our audio engineer and producer

spk_0 with help from Hewan Park and Juan Nhi Du.

Calibrating China Ties - Indonesia

Interactive Transcript

Topics Covered

Related Episodes

584 - The 4 Fundamentals of Lasting Change: Start today and change your life with Molly Claire

Manifest Space: Intuitive Machines CEO on $800 Million Deal and Building a Lunar Communications Network 11/7/25

Bloomberg Businessweek Weekend: November 7th, 2025

What’s Up THIS WEEK: ChatGPT HUGE Change! 🐦 Threads Catching Up. 📊 3rd Grade Level Marketing Works! | Ep. 425

Share Episode