Episode 8. Atomic Backfires in a New Nuclear Age: Dr. Stephen Herzog on a Crumbling Nuclear Order, Missile Shields, New Wars and Old Bombs

Interactive Transcript

spk_0 Hello and welcome back to Geopolz.

spk_0 In this episode we are joined by Dr. Stephen Herzog, professor of the practice at the Middle

spk_0 Barrier Institute of International Studies at Monterey and researcher at the James Martin

spk_0 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the world's largest NGO dedicated to preventing the spread

spk_0 of nuclear weapons.

spk_0 He is also an associate at Harvard University's project on managing the atom and has previously

spk_0 served at the ETH Zurich, the US Department of Energy and at the Federation of American

spk_0 Scientists.

spk_0 Dr. Herzog's work focuses on the global nuclear order governance, emerging technologies

spk_0 and public opinion in international security.

spk_0 His writing has appeared in international security, the bulletin of the atomic scientists,

spk_0 science, survival and many more.

spk_0 Later this year his co-edited book, Atomic Backfires, when nuclear policies fail, will

spk_0 be published by the MIT Press.

spk_0 In this conversation we discussed with him, the state of the nuclear nonproliferation

spk_0 regime 80 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, global public opinion on nuclear

spk_0 weapons and arms control, the implications of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict,

spk_0 the impact of emerging technologies and missile defense on strategic stability, the future

spk_0 of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

spk_0 Kunein for a timely and in-depth discussion on nuclear risks, policy failures and challenges

spk_0 ahead for global security.

spk_0 Hello and welcome to Geopols.

spk_0 Today's episode was inspired by a recent piece in the conversation by Dr. Stephen Herzog.

spk_0 Titled the three-demand to control nuclear risks is under strain 80 years after the

spk_0 US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

spk_0 I read it with great interest and it sparked our discussion today.

spk_0 Dr. Herzog is professor of the practice at the Middlebury Institute of International

spk_0 Studies at Monterey, where he works with James Martin-Setter for Nonproliferation

spk_0 Studies and is also an associate at Harvard University's project on managing the atom.

spk_0 His research spans on nuclear governance, emerging technologies and public opinion international

spk_0 security.

spk_0 Later this year MIT press will publish a bookie co-edited atomic backfires when nuclear

spk_0 policies fail.

spk_0 Dr. Herzog, welcome to Geopols.

spk_0 Thank you so much for having me.

spk_0 I really appreciate it.

spk_0 Thank you for being with us.

spk_0 It's an honor.

spk_0 As we mark the 80th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, how do you assess the current

spk_0 state of the nuclear proliferation regime?

spk_0 So this is a really difficult question.

spk_0 And in the piece in the conversation that I wrote, I talk about how the bombings of Hiroshima

spk_0 and Nagasaki and their effects were part of the creation of the nuclear nonproliferation

spk_0 regime and the NPT in 1968, because after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945,

spk_0 initially the bombings were seen as a way for the allies to end the war and they were

spk_0 seen as part of a war-winning narrative.

spk_0 Now over time, as nuclear weapons got more dangerous as we move from fission-only atomic

spk_0 weapons to thermonuclear weapons and as the stories of the Hibakusha, the survivors

spk_0 got out.

spk_0 Ideas about nuclear weapons had changed.

spk_0 And so the NPT, as it stands, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is a treaty which is based

spk_0 in part on the horrors caused by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it's also based

spk_0 in large part on the self-interest of the great powers who sought to have a treaty that

spk_0 would prevent other countries from having nuclear weapons but would allow them to have nuclear

spk_0 weapons with kind of a nebulous timeline in the treaty for nuclear disarmament.

spk_0 And the interesting thing about the NPT is that ever since 1968, people have been saying that

spk_0 the NPT is going to collapse and that the NPT is in trouble. And the thing about that is,

spk_0 is today we have just nine nuclear arm states, the P5, so the United States, Russia, China,

spk_0 Britain and France, but also India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, the latter four being

spk_0 outside of the NPT. And South Africa, of course, developed nuclear weapons and then gave it up

spk_0 at the, gave them up at the twilight of apartheid. And I believe that the nuclear nonproliferation

spk_0 regime has actually done quite an incredible job in limiting nuclear proliferation. So the NPT

spk_0 is not really fair because it allows some countries to have nuclear weapons and other countries

spk_0 don't get to have nuclear weapons and there are inequities with that. But what it does is it provides

spk_0 a benefit in general to states. States like middle powers will say an Argentina or Brazil thinking

spk_0 about developing nuclear weapons in the past can rest assured that the International Atomic Energy

spk_0 Agency is conducting inspections on the territory of their would-be rivals so they don't have to

spk_0 develop the bomb. And I would say that those benefits have really, you know, they've taken us

spk_0 a long way and I think that without the NPT, without the IAEA inspections, we have a lot more

spk_0 countries that have nuclear weapons. But today I think there are a lot of strains in the world.

spk_0 One strain that I would point to immediately is Russia's war on Ukraine. And I think that that war

spk_0 has been interesting given that Ukraine gave up the world's third largest nuclear arsenal, even though

spk_0 they didn't necessarily have operational control of the weapons as the weapons remained in Moscow.

spk_0 And Ukraine wound up being invaded by Russia. And we can talk more about that if we need to.

spk_0 And it goes back to this legacy that that's what happened to Ukraine. Saddam Hussein in the 80s

spk_0 tries to develop nuclear weapons. And eventually we know the Gulf War happens and we saw what happened

spk_0 to Saddam, Gaddafi in Libya. We saw what happened there. So there's a potential view which may be

spk_0 permeating throughout the world that a state's sovereignty can only be protected by having nuclear

spk_0 weapons, which is really scary. Simultaneously, a second dynamic that I would point to

spk_0 that is happening right now in the world beyond Ukraine is the Israeli and US attacks on the

spk_0 Iranian civilian nuclear program, which may also be sending this idea about a country's sovereignty

spk_0 may only be protected by nuclear weapons. And a third dynamic is the Trump administration talking

spk_0 about potentially having US retrenchment around the globe in the name of America first foreign

spk_0 policy. And it's been really shocking to see countries that are under the nuclear umbrella like

spk_0 Poland and like South Korea now talking about potentially developing their own nuclear weapons.

spk_0 So kind of this confluence of events that we see right now, the Russian war in Ukraine,

spk_0 the US and Israeli counter proliferation strikes on Iran and as well as this last dynamic

spk_0 that I pointed to about potential US retrenchment, put us in a position that the nuclear

spk_0 non-proliferation regime, which has been around for so long and has been so successful for many

spk_0 years, I think may be encountering a new series of threats. And this is something to pay attention to.

spk_0 And my fear is this, that as we get further and further away from the legacies of

spk_0 Hiroshima and Nagasaki and those traumatic consequences and as the survivors are all passing away,

spk_0 I feel like we might be getting further away from thinking about that narrative about the

spk_0 destructiveness of nuclear weapons. And there are I think right now are all sorts of reasons to

spk_0 legitimately be concerned. So building on that and in light of what you mentioned,

spk_0 do you think we live in a new nuclear age where people sort of undermine the destructive power

spk_0 of nuclear weapons, but at the same time float with the idea of deploying technical nuclear weapons

spk_0 or using nuclear weapons to safeguard their sovereignty in case of countries like Iran or North

spk_0 Korea or even Ukraine, which had stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Do you think that that's we have

spk_0 entered into into more dangerous nuclear age? So I think that in many respects that that's true,

spk_0 although I would say that some of the arguments from the past about tactical nuclear weapons and a

spk_0 fear of nuclear proliferation have been repeated. And there's a great book which came out recently by

spk_0 my colleague, Ankit Ponda, who's at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which talks about

spk_0 kind of this new dangerous nuclear age that we're entering into, which I think is is well worth a

spk_0 read by people. But what I would say is we are facing a nuclear age now where there are a few

spk_0 dynamics that I think did not exist before. During the Cold War through the NPT, the United States

spk_0 and the Soviet Union were able to pressure their allies and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

spk_0 weapons. Today, I would say with the potential for US retrenchment and with Russia violating some

spk_0 nuclear norms given its behavior in Ukraine, I would say that maybe some of the consensus between

spk_0 the United States and Russia on preventing nuclear proliferation is not there in the same way that

spk_0 it was before. And that leads me to be deeply concerned, particularly when I hear about countries

spk_0 under the US nuclear umbrella thinking about developing nuclear weapons. So that's 0.1.

spk_0 0.2 is we are at a strange time in history when in order to deal with the effects of human

spk_0 induced climate change, there is now a new push for a nuclear renaissance. And support for civilian

spk_0 nuclear energy is permeating around the world. And you know, whether it's the COP28 summit or the

spk_0 international panel on climate change, what we're seeing is that we're coming to a recognition

spk_0 that civilian use of nuclear energy is particularly important. And it is going to spread around the

spk_0 world and it is going to spread to countries that may be less democratic than those in the past that

spk_0 had civilian nuclear energy and may be interested in getting the bomb. So I find that to be concerning.

spk_0 And then the next thing that I would say is concerning and I have a piece coming out on this

spk_0 eventually with my colleague David Allison from Yale University is artificial intelligence.

spk_0 And what might artificial intelligence mean for nuclear weapons? And on the one hand, I would say

spk_0 people have focused a lot on the idea of integrating artificial intelligence with nuclear

spk_0 commanded control and compressing decision making timelines. But my point would be this.

spk_0 What might artificial intelligence do for helping some states overcome tacit knowledge barriers

spk_0 to building the bomb? Could you with the exponential expansion of artificial intelligence in terms

spk_0 of its ability to do, you know, engineering and computing? Could you get to a point that artificial

spk_0 intelligence in large language models could essentially replicate the power and prowess of an

spk_0 entire nuclear weapons design team and essentially help states to overcome proliferation barriers that

spk_0 in the past might have been bottlenecks. Of course, you still need to get the nuclear materials.

spk_0 But what if you could use artificial intelligence to develop components of a bomb that

spk_0 were more difficult to build or, you know, centrifuges that you could develop

spk_0 indigenously that were more difficult to detect? So these dynamics are all at play simultaneously.

spk_0 An evaporating consensus between the great powers on nuclear proliferation, a spread of civilian

spk_0 nuclear technologies around the world and the development of emerging technologies. Now,

spk_0 I don't think this means that the NPT is dead. I don't think it means that we're going to see

spk_0 immediate nuclear proliferation coming at any time. But I do think we are entering, as you said,

spk_0 a dangerous new nuclear age in which the proliferation dynamics and non-proliferation dynamics

spk_0 of the past are changing and they require new focus and new institutional structures and a

spk_0 renewed commitment to essentially prevent the spread of the world's most dangerous weapons.

spk_0 Now, with that explanation, I think it's fair to ask question on nuclear policy and maybe

spk_0 maybe a book. You are co-editing a book called Atomic Backfires when nuclear policies fail.

spk_0 Can you tell us broadly about what this book is going to cover? Of course, when it comes out,

spk_0 I highly recommend readers go and get our listeners to go and get a copy. But what are the broad

spk_0 topics and broad issues that this book intends to cover? So, atomic backfires when nuclear policies

spk_0 fail is an edited volume that I have edited with my collaborators, Giles David Arsano from the

spk_0 University of Tennessee and Ariel F.W. Petrovich from the University of Maryland. It will come out

spk_0 with MIT Press and probably mid-December this year. I think pre-order starts in about a month and

spk_0 it should actually hopefully be open access and available for people to freely download if

spk_0 all goes well. And it features really a great group of contributors. So, everyone from, let's say,

spk_0 Kristen Van Breusegaard, who's the director of the Norwegian Intelligence School,

spk_0 Uruk Koon, who directs the Arms Control and Emerging Technologies program at the University of

spk_0 Hamburg, James Cameron, a historian of arms control at the University of Oslo, or Bekadevus Gibbons,

spk_0 a steam nuclear disarmament scholar at the University of Southern Maine, and so many more great

spk_0 colleagues who are in this book. And the thing about the book is it looks at unintended consequences

spk_0 in nuclear policy. And essentially, we have known for years, obviously, that nuclear weapons are

spk_0 dangerous, but academics really like to focus on the causes of success in nuclear policy when they

spk_0 write. So, there are a lot of studies out there that talk about, you know, sanctions efficacy and

spk_0 things like that, or how to negotiate a successful arms control agreement. And we look at unintended

spk_0 consequences. And our point is this, that a lot of times states default to standard operating

spk_0 procedures in nuclear policy, this standard toolkit. And in pursuing peace, things may actually

spk_0 backfire and make the potential for all the things you're trying to stop more likely, may make

spk_0 the potential for proliferation more likely, may make the potential for nuclear weapons use more

spk_0 likely. So, let's give an example, right? My colleague Daniel Salisbury at King's College

spk_0 London wrote a chapter for us on supply side export controls. And we tend to think that supply

spk_0 side export controls are a great thing because they can prevent the spread of sensitive dual use

spk_0 technologies, which can be used to build nuclear weapons or other associated materials. But Daniel

spk_0 Salisbury shows through his cases in our book that by having rigid supply side controls,

spk_0 what the international community has done at a lot of respects is taken potential proliferators,

spk_0 like let's say today, well North Korea is a potential proliferator or Iran or Libya or Pakistan.

spk_0 And essentially encourage them to develop indigenous capabilities that help them subvert export

spk_0 controls because they began to focus internally on ways that they could master things so they

spk_0 weren't reliant on the international supply chain. And we also have, for example, my colleague

spk_0 Hune Bin-Chou at the College of New Jersey who writes about like signaling in crises, how states

spk_0 and nuclear crises oftentimes signal their adversaries to try and get them to back down. And there's

spk_0 well, what if doing so could trigger an adversaries concerns related to honor and reputation and

spk_0 actually make them more likely to escalate a crisis. Or as I mentioned, my colleague Rebecca

spk_0 Davis-Gibbons writes about the idea of arms control. And for years and years and years, we thought

spk_0 that arms control is a way in the classic definition by Thomas Shelling and Mort Halper and is

spk_0 we're thinking about, you know, we're trying to reduce the cost of essentially nuclear war

spk_0 and preparations for war by eliminating, you know, certain weapons and creating restrictions.

spk_0 But in the United States, the Obama administration, for example, when pursuing arms control treaties

spk_0 needed to buy off nuclear hawks among the Republican Party. And in doing so, Obama had to make

spk_0 essentially pledges for, you know, 30 year more than $1 trillion nuclear modernization program

spk_0 in the United States. And at the point of arms control is to reduce the cost of nuclear war

spk_0 and the preparations for nuclear war. And the end result is you wind up with a substantial

spk_0 modernization program of the arsenal. Maybe that's a counterproductive consequence. So there are so

spk_0 many other studies out there, you know, my colleague, you know, Sarah Bidgood at the University of

spk_0 California writes about, you know, ballistic missile defense and how US attempts to engage in

spk_0 ballistic missile defense to reduce nuclear dangers actually caused asymmetric responses by the Soviet

spk_0 Union slash Russia. And what they resulted in doing is they actually, you know, accelerated and

spk_0 increased dangers to the United States. So that is is overall, and I really appreciate you plugging

spk_0 it here. The idea of atomic backfires when nuclear policies fail that even the best intention policies

spk_0 for achieving nuclear peace may actually make nuclear dangers more difficult. And the point that the

spk_0 authors are making in this book across the board is not that we should give up on the standard

spk_0 operating procedures and toolkit. It's that we should understand the conditions under when certain

spk_0 policies are likely to succeed and when certain policies are likely to fail and kind of approach

spk_0 the issue judiciously from a holistic perspective and you just kind of be smart about thinking it

spk_0 rather than just defaulting to, you know, your SOP on things. Yeah, I mean, these are fascinating

spk_0 developments, which we will delve later on on the effects of AI and emerging technologies,

spk_0 wireless, you know, missile defense technology are this on putting constraints on the NPT or

spk_0 generally on arm control. But before I would like to keep it on the Hiroshima Nagasaki anniversary

spk_0 and its memory before we jump into the next section. Do you think the how effective does the

spk_0 memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings continue to influence nuclear norms today? I mean,

spk_0 the people this new generation I suppose we could we could say really appreciate the

spk_0 destructiveness of this technology and know what sort of a world awaits them or you think that

spk_0 memory is fading and people are sort of becoming less and less cognizant of the dangers of

spk_0 nuclear weapons. So I would say one good manifestation of this is that in 2024 the Nobel Peace Prize

spk_0 was won by Nihon Hedonko, which is essentially the group of Hibakusha, which you know are the

spk_0 stories of survivors. I have to look maybe it was 2025 I think it was 2024, but they won that

spk_0 based on the stories that they have provided to the world as far as nuclear weapons and the

spk_0 narrative of survivors. And I think that the narrative of survivors is key and has been key

spk_0 and it has changed the world. And one needs to and we were talking about this before we got started

spk_0 recording. One needs to only go to the Peace Park and the museum in Hiroshima to see the consequences

spk_0 and to just walk around in that museum and you see for example essentially people's shadows

spk_0 who were you know the shadow is kind of emblazoned. They cut me off there for a second?

spk_0 No I'm here. I'm sorry I'll continue again it might be street closed. Okay so one need only

spk_0 visit the Peace Museum at Hiroshima in order to see the consequences of nuclear weapons to see

spk_0 people who were essentially turned into ash or vaporized and see their shadows. You know on a rock

spk_0 or to see the you know shoes of young children or the bicycles or pieces of playground from that time

spk_0 and what happened and see the imagery. And I think that those stories are very powerful and

spk_0 there are some of the most powerful stories that we have about nuclear weapons. And your question

spk_0 is, has the younger generation gotten away from this? And it's a very interesting question

spk_0 because I think that the younger generations around the world including in Great Powers have not

spk_0 had to deal with duck and cover drills and they've not had to deal with constant nuclear threats.

spk_0 You know during the Cold War there were you know nuclear weapons test on average I believe it's

spk_0 something like every eight or nine days there would be a nuclear weapons test for about almost you

spk_0 know for decades. And since in this in this millennium as we've started right since we've hit the

spk_0 year 2000 the only country which has tested nuclear weapons and most young people may remember at

spk_0 all is North Korea and India and Pakistan in 1998 was was the last time before that that had happened.

spk_0 And so I think there's a real question about whether young people have engaged with the risk.

spk_0 And one of the things which has been notable in the past few years is the Russian war in Ukraine

spk_0 and all of the nuclear threats of the Russian Federation directed at either Ukraine or NATO.

spk_0 And scholars in Germany have had a report and they've shown that Putin has engaged in more than

spk_0 in his cronies have engaged in more than 200 nuclear signals since the beginning of the Russian

spk_0 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And people around the world have really responded with shock.

spk_0 And one need only look to all the news stories about nuclear weapons that we've seen

spk_0 about how to survive a nuclear war and how to engage with nuclear weapons or in Europe in some

spk_0 countries where there's been a demand for potassium iodide pills in order to help people with

spk_0 their thyroid in the case that there are nuclear weapons being used. And you can look as well

spk_0 at for example trends on Google. Google trends will tell you that in February 2022 that searches for

spk_0 nuclear-related topics were dozens of times higher than they were just a few months earlier,

spk_0 which is not a surprise when the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine and made this statement

spk_0 and Putin about the consequences that you have never seen before in your history if there would

spk_0 be external intervention. And the fascinating thing about this to me is that nuclear weapons

spk_0 survived the Cold War but they never went away. We just stopped talking about nuclear weapons

spk_0 in the same way. And so today there are about 12,100 nuclear weapons in the world. At the peak of

spk_0 the Cold War there are about 70,000. This is a substantial decrease in nuclear weapons still

spk_0 enough to destroy the world many times over. There are still thousands of cities around the world

spk_0 that are half an hour away from being destroyed but publics have not grappled with nuclear issues

spk_0 I would say in quite some time. So in some strange twisted, ironic way I would say that what Vladimir

spk_0 Putin has done with all the nuclear threats in the war in Ukraine has reminded people of the scary

spk_0 bits and pieces of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence which have existed for a while and we

spk_0 just haven't talked about them. Every country that has nuclear weapons for deterrence, countries

spk_0 under the nuclear umbrella that rely on extended nuclear deterrence, what they are fundamentally doing

spk_0 is they are relying on nuclear threats. And one need only talk to people from US strategic

spk_0 command in Nebraska, the military branch who is in charge of essentially using nuclear weapons

spk_0 and war planning. And people there will tell you in the United States that we use nuclear weapons

spk_0 every day and that they protect the United States by having that to turn. So the question is this,

spk_0 what about younger generations? And I dare say that for younger generations,

spk_0 Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine may be some of Trump's signaling to Kim Jong-un and Twitter,

spk_0 my nuclear button is bigger than yours, is the first time that for example Gen Z has really had

spk_0 to think about and to grapple with nuclear weapons. For some older generations that may have

spk_0 forgotten about them or may have grown up in the 90s in a period of unipolarity and may not

spk_0 have thought about this, they as well have to grapple with it. So there's an interesting thing. For

spk_0 older generations, I think there's kind of a challenge implicit to nuclear experts that how do we

spk_0 talk about nuclear weapons without scaring people's grandmothers about them? But I would say for the

spk_0 younger generations who haven't really encountered nuclear weapons, I've been really surprised at the way

spk_0 they think about these issues. We just had for the anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki earlier

spk_0 this week and event at the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies where we had some of our

spk_0 visiting undergraduate fellows and we asked them about nuclear weapons and how they feel. And I feel

spk_0 like for Gen Z, which has a very different approach to a lot of issues, nuclear deterrence to a lot

spk_0 of them seems almost illogical. Like nuclear weapons didn't exist before 1945. We now have them,

spk_0 we're now pointing them at cities and somehow by developing the world's most destructive weapons

spk_0 and pointing them at cities, there's an argument that we're all safer. And to a lot of people in

spk_0 Gen Z, this seems to be really illogical. And so another thing that I would point out really quickly too

spk_0 is a few weeks ago I was in Chicago at an event called Nobel laureates for peace and it was about

spk_0 40 or 50 nuclear experts from around the world, including myself, and Nobel laureates from around

spk_0 the world from various disciplines. And what we're doing is talking, having dialogue and hoping that

spk_0 some of the Nobel laureates will use their platforms to advocate for nuclear risk reduction and

spk_0 eventual disarmament. And the thing that I saw there was that among Nobel laureates, their position

spk_0 is common is your general average person on the street. And that is for Nobel laureates, this is simple.

spk_0 Getting rid of nuclear dangers is a two plus two equation for most of them. You've got to get rid of

spk_0 nuclear weapons. Now how we do so in the long run, I think is difficult, but really the strongest

spk_0 advocates for nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is a certain community of people who are experts

spk_0 on this issue who think through the logic of nuclear deterrence and they think about it and they think

spk_0 you about it rigorously. And they believe that that makes people safe, that nuclear deterrence makes

spk_0 people safe. For most people in the world, disarmament is what they believe makes people safe. But I'll

spk_0 make one final point. I've got a study coming out down the road with my colleagues Lauren Suchen

spk_0 from the London School of Economics and Oxford. And my college, Colleague Louis Thurarder, he

spk_0 goes from George Mason University. And we ask publics in 24 countries, what do you think about

spk_0 nuclear weapons about deterrence and disarmament? And what we find is this, that the majority of people

spk_0 in the world are pro-disarmament. But many people in many countries, the publics, are simultaneously

spk_0 pro-deterrence and actually in countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia and Indonesia and Taiwan

spk_0 actually want their countries to develop nuclear weapons. So this is interesting that how can the

spk_0 publics in the same countries want both deterrence and disarmament at the same time? And what we find

spk_0 is that your modal human being in the world is conflicted on deterrence and disarmament. A

spk_0 disarmament advocate will tell you that an end goal for the world is disarmament. A deterrence

spk_0 advocate might tell you that an end goal for the world is having robust deterrence and arsenals.

spk_0 But this is a specialist perspective for the average human on the streets.

spk_0 Deterrence and disarmament are not ends. They are means. People care about taking care of their

spk_0 families, protecting their country, putting food on the table, things like that. And so what's

spk_0 interesting about this is that if the end goal is survival and thriving and prospering, maybe

spk_0 deterrence and disarmament are just means to an end. And there's a large information space

spk_0 and publics around the world are quite flexible. So it leaves kind of a lot of open space as to

spk_0 where we go with this in the future. Yeah, that's fascinating. The two things I would like to add.

spk_0 Number one, I remember or I saw a particular movie, there used to be several defense courses

spk_0 during the Cold War of showing videos of how to duck and cover or using these potassium

spk_0 tablets. Another is for the population or was it I don't know before that.

spk_0 The other thing, this Japanese group, the grassroots organization to dimension won the

spk_0 Novel Peace Prize in 2024. Now having mentioned that nobody wants to go back and having

spk_0 several defense courses for populations of various countries because there's some sort of

spk_0 an eminent threat. But at the same time, there's a lot of flooding with the idea of deploying

spk_0 tactical nuclear weapons as if it is okay to drop a small nuclear weapon in a battlefield.

spk_0 And a lot of this talk has been happening over Ukraine. I mean, I've talked to Tink Tankers in DC

spk_0 which really, which is mind boggling. And these are some of these folks are

spk_0 from, they come from defense background, military and defense background. And they have taken part

spk_0 in various, you know, war tiers as recently in the war against terrorism. Do you think that's

spk_0 sort of a mindset where Tink Tankers and others believe that tactical nuclear weapons is okay

spk_0 and should be, you know, used or, or, or, or, or, you know, at least the idea should be flurtered with.

spk_0 Is okay? So I think there are a number of different things to unpack and I appreciate you, you know,

spk_0 bringing up this, this conversation. And all this flooding with tactical nuclear weapons has

spk_0 led to a situation in which experts can't tell you what they think is the actual probability of

spk_0 nuclear weapons being used. And, you know, there was that time in 2022 where we know that the US

spk_0 intelligence community assessed that there was a 50% chance that Russia would use nuclear weapons,

spk_0 which is very, very, very concerning. And it's believed that China and to a lesser extent,

spk_0 India, which maintained no first use policies on nuclear weapons, were able to exert pressure on the

spk_0 Trump, I'm sorry, the Putin administration, in order to stop them from using nuclear weapons.

spk_0 I have gathered groups of experts together, some of the world's top nuclear experts from countries.

spk_0 And I've said to them, like, what do you, like, what do you peg this at the probability? And the

spk_0 answers range from anything from less than 1% to over 50%. And if experts think this, like the

spk_0 confidence intervals on that are huge. One thing that we can say about Russia and the use of nuclear

spk_0 weapons in Ukraine is I don't believe that it's just solely an idea of China and India pressuring

spk_0 Russia, or the fact that I believe that Russia would lose support from the global south,

spk_0 if it would use nuclear weapons, which has been an economic and political lifeline for the Russian

spk_0 Federation. The question is, is how could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine?

spk_0 Now, tactical nuclear weapons are, right, seen as being lower yield and seeing as being usable

spk_0 on the battlefield, because the idea is you want to tip the balance of a conflict in favor of your

spk_0 military versus an exter, versus your adversary. In order for tactical nuclear weapons to be

spk_0 used effectively, you essentially need fixed stationary targets. In Ukraine, the Ukrainian military

spk_0 is not fixed in stationary, it's highly mobile and moving around, and the reason why is because

spk_0 they're trying to avoid Russian conventional weapons. And so because they move around, there aren't

spk_0 a whole lot of good targets for the use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. And also Russia has

spk_0 shown that it can pretty much destroy what it wants to in Ukraine with conventional weapons.

spk_0 The other thing about it is if you're the Russian Federation and you want to take territory

spk_0 in Ukraine using nuclear weapons there, probably not a great idea on the territory that you want to

spk_0 take, probably not going to help you gain the support of the population, but also a lot of these

spk_0 Russian troops recruited from the regions in Russia, from the Far East and whatnot,

spk_0 Siberia are not well trained, don't have good personal protective equipment, so you don't really

spk_0 want to walk them through these areas. So it's difficult identifying military targets for the

spk_0 tactical use of nuclear weapons. But I'll say this much. If we look at, for example, what open

spk_0 sources will tell you about US tactical nuclear weapons. Today's US tactical nuclear weapons,

spk_0 with variable yield settings, range and explosive yield from 0.3 metric tons of TNT to 160

spk_0 kilotons of TNT, so 160,000 metric tons of TNT. And that's a lot. And I would just encourage people

spk_0 who are readers of this to, you know, readers and listeners start to go online and look, and what

spk_0 happened, the conventional explosion that happened in Beirut is estimated to be somewhere between

spk_0 300 and 500 metric tons. And we saw what that said to, did to the city of Beirut. And the lowest

spk_0 yield tactical nuclear weapons we might be talking about being used in Ukraine are probably around that.

spk_0 And there are other ones, which are hundreds and hundreds of times more powerful than that.

spk_0 For some context, the bombing of Hiroshima was between 14 and 15 kilotons, 14 to 15,000 metric

spk_0 tons of TNT. And Nagasaki was 22 kilotons. Now Hiroshima is estimated to have killed 140,000 or more.

spk_0 Nagasaki 70,000 or more. But the true human consequences in the long run, long-term radiation

spk_0 affects other things, may never truly be known. Tactical nuclear weapons that would be used are

spk_0 likely to be more powerful than this to leave lasting environmental consequences. And I believe

spk_0 to change the world in ways that we would not have expected by rolling back the nuclear taboo.

spk_0 Now when I say things like this, I sometimes get criticism. And people say Putin isn't going to use

spk_0 tactical nuclear weapons against troops or anywhere that he'll carry out a so-called demonstration

spk_0 shot over the Black Sea, over a forest in Ukraine to signal to the world that he is serious about

spk_0 using nuclear weapons that Ukraine should surrender or that NATO should stay out. Now, if Putin were to do

spk_0 this, it would probably be pretty clear that the United States would do something at least

spk_0 conventionally. And a long time ago, David Petraeus, former CIA director, sent-com director,

spk_0 his general commander said that the United States would probably almost immediately destroy

spk_0 the Russian Black Sea fleet. Putin, if he does this, knows that he would face consequences from

spk_0 the United States to NATO. And Trump has even talked about how if Putin would use nuclear weapons,

spk_0 the United States might have to bomb Moscow. So I think if you want NATO to stay out of Ukraine,

spk_0 the best way to get NATO involved in Ukraine is for Russia to use nuclear weapons. But this whole

spk_0 idea of a demonstration shot is particularly worrisome for me as well. Let's say when I talked about

spk_0 the effects of nuclear weapons that they were less powerful and the consequences were less than

spk_0 Hiroshima or Nagasaki, whether it's that demonstration shot over a forest, whether it's over the Black

spk_0 Sea. This is really concerning to me because the idea of the taboo against using nuclear weapons

spk_0 is based on the premise of how destructive they are. If they're shown to not be that destructive,

spk_0 that may in my view, quote, conventionalize nuclear weapons, and would show great powers

spk_0 around the world that maybe it's okay to use lower, lower, the yield nuclear weapons,

spk_0 which I think could put us on the escalation ladder somewhere and could open the door to something

spk_0 much more devastating than we'd ever thought could happen. Yeah, when the risk of escalation

spk_0 is going to be very high, also miscalculation and misinterpretation, but that's something that we

spk_0 would cover in a bit. But given all we discussed, do you think the NPT now is a meaningful mechanism

spk_0 to impose constraint on proliferation? Is this entire NPT regime in need of an update and

spk_0 renegotiation and institutions such as IEA, do they still meet the needs of the day, or you think

spk_0 we are in a sort of a situation where we cannot get rid of these things or update them, but at the

spk_0 time we cannot get rid of them. Which do you take on that? So I think, and it is an

spk_0 optimist take on this, is that the NPT is not dead. It's not going away. And again,

spk_0 that people have declared it dead for more than 50 years, and it still provides incentives

spk_0 to these middle powers that may consider developing nuclear weapons because they're able to get

spk_0 civilian nuclear energy cooperation with the IAEA, and they're able to know that their potential

spk_0 regional rivals will not develop nuclear weapons because of IAEA safeguards inspections

spk_0 that are designed to ensure that civilian nuclear materials are not being transferred to military

spk_0 nuclear weapons program. So I think it's still useful. However, the success of the NPT,

spk_0 whether it was during the Cold War, whether it was during the 90s when it was indefinitely

spk_0 extended in 1995, has for a long time been premised on great power cooperation.

spk_0 And I am worried that we may see a lack of great power nexus when promoting nonproliferation.

spk_0 Three examples. The Trump administration has made comments that maybe it would be good if Japan and

spk_0 South Korea developed their own nuclear weapons so they could essentially burden share and pay their

spk_0 own fair share. That suggests to me that if US allies under the umbrella decided to develop nuclear

spk_0 weapons, it's possible that the Trump administration would not punish and economically isolate them,

spk_0 which I find to be worrisome. The next is that Russia's Orozatom, its Atomic Energy Agency,

spk_0 is the leader in the world for civilian nuclear energy cooperation. And it continues to build reactors

spk_0 around the world. China is focused internally on building nuclear reactors. The United States is

spk_0 a little bit slow, even though they're not going to have a deal with Slovakia to develop nuclear

spk_0 reactors. Russia cares less about nonproliferation, I believe, than the United States does when

spk_0 exporting civilian nuclear technology. The US has historically made countries sign an additional

spk_0 protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which allows the IAEA to carry out more

spk_0 stringent inspections and to use a more rigorous set of tools. Russia does not require this.

spk_0 Russia built the Estravets Nuclear Power Plant in Belarus, despite Belarus not having an

spk_0 additional protocol enforce, is now helping with the LDABBA power plant in Egypt, despite the fact

spk_0 that Egypt will not take on an additional protocol at the IAEA and in the past has been found with

spk_0 nuclear materials outside of its safeguards declaration. So I worry about that and about

spk_0 Russian commitment, also about Russia and China engaging in gray area transactions that I believe

spk_0 have helped Iran and North Korea skirt some sanctions. And then third is that China historically has

spk_0 sat on the sidelines of this. China was a late-comer to the NPT, and China has never really played a

spk_0 big nonproliferation role, so I think China could be the key in many ways. So I would say to circle

spk_0 around here. I think that the NPT exists, countries are not rushing to leave it, but I think right

spk_0 now we see really worrisome trends with all three great powers as far as their long-term willingness

spk_0 to promote the nonproliferation regime. If you add to that, the idea that civilian nuclear energy

spk_0 is having a renaissance, and there is now an interest, for example, in using small modular reactors

spk_0 to power data centers for AI and to deal with climate change, I think that we are coming up to a

spk_0 point where some level of modernization, I think as you suggested, is probably necessary for the

spk_0 nonproliferation regime. It's how do we update international atomic energy agency safeguards

spk_0 standards to deal with small modular reactors in the future and who's going to put the bill

spk_0 to deal with this? The NPT at its recent review conferences has not come to final consensus documents.

spk_0 How do we make the NPT relevant again to dealing with great power competition, to dealing with

spk_0 advanced reactor technology? And I think one of the ways is, is if the NPT, if we can't get

spk_0 consensus documents at review conferences because of great power competition, because of

spk_0 issues in the Middle East, I think NPT review conference needs to take on subsidiary bodies,

spk_0 which is permitted in the review cycle, which take on things like great power competition,

spk_0 like advanced reactor tech, and things like that, and help them in artificial intelligence

spk_0 and help to make it relevant to the things we care about in today's world.

spk_0 Yeah, that's a good wrap to move to our other topic, which is nuclear arms control.

spk_0 Are we entering a post-armed control era? I mean, in view of the fact that the treaties like

spk_0 the INF and New Start has unraveled and collapsed, and do we need a new mechanism for arms control?

spk_0 So I think the answer is, is that we are moving into an era of arms control, which is very

spk_0 difficult. We've seen, as you mentioned, the INF Treaty has, has 1980, 1987, is unraveled.

spk_0 The open skies treaty has unraveled. The CTBT, which never entered the forest,

spk_0 comprehensive nuclear test band treaty, has serious issues with the United States and China,

spk_0 having signed but not ratified. Russia having de-ratified under Putin, but maintaining its signature.

spk_0 A new start, which expires, its extension expires early next year, has not been essentially observed

spk_0 for a while and has been suspended by the Russian Federation and data exchanges between the United

spk_0 States and Russia and onsite inspections are not currently happening. So I think that we are

spk_0 in an era where the United States and Russia, with the world's two large disarcenals,

spk_0 have no legally binding inspection and source, sorry, legally binding instrument and source of

spk_0 onsite inspections for the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. China is expected if you believe

spk_0 the CIA estimates to eventually triple its nuclear arsenal in the next decade or so, and China

spk_0 has no real history of engaging in formal legally binding nuclear arms control, in part because the

spk_0 transparency associated with formal legally binding nuclear arms control would reveal the locations

spk_0 of China's smaller arsenal and perhaps discredit its secure second strike capabilities.

spk_0 So we are moving into a dangerous new era, throw emerging tech in there which can intersect

spk_0 with nuclear arsenals and I think we have a problem. So I think one of the things which is

spk_0 immediately needed is a return to strategic nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia,

spk_0 and hopefully the Trump administration is very cognizant of the fact that nuclear weapons played

spk_0 such a big role in the war in Ukraine and essentially giving capacity to Putin's invasion,

spk_0 and so maybe that's a good reason why we ought to think about controlling the Russian nuclear arsenal.

spk_0 But as you say, I think it will be very difficult because we have a rise right now in the world of

spk_0 essentially populism as well. And so the Trump administration is highly skeptical of international

spk_0 institutions and legally binding treaties which might create the legal authorities for doing

spk_0 onsite inspections and verification. So future arms control might be big kind of leader-centric

spk_0 diplomacy summit declarations like we saw between the United States and in North Korea, given the

spk_0 Singapore summit declaration, which eventually collapsed during the Hanoi summit which focus on

spk_0 leaders, their specific role and kind of informality without kind of legally binding verification

spk_0 authorities. So I think it's important to think about those. And I would say between the United

spk_0 States and Russia, with the size of their nuclear arsenals over 4,000 to each right now,

spk_0 that maybe you don't need the same kind of legally binding verification even though I think it

spk_0 would be really helpful to make some progress. One of the things which has been most successful

spk_0 for us arms control is the presidential nuclear issues of the 90s between the United States and

spk_0 Soviet Union and Russia, which essentially resulted in the largest reductions of nuclear weapons

spk_0 around the world, entire classes of nuclear weapons based on essentially informal pledges

spk_0 and without verification. So that's one thing. Another thing is like how do we adapt arms control

spk_0 to the world of emerging and disruptive technologies, artificial intelligence and others that being

spk_0 do use, which are being less tangible. And so I think these big broad formal declarations, I think

spk_0 are pretty important. And I think as well that one of the things that may need to happen,

spk_0 as you may need, essentially more of a focus on like cartels and supplier clubs, like we saw

spk_0 with the nuclear suppliers group, which came about after India carried out its peaceful nuclear

spk_0 explosion, nuclear test in 1974, that there was an attempt to control the supply. There may be an

spk_0 interest among countries which are heavily invested in AI to essentially create agreements for

spk_0 guardrails between them about the use of AI in the nuclear domain and also controlling the export

spk_0 of certain chips. But this is all really difficult. And thinking about applying the frame of arms

spk_0 control moving forward, I think is a little bit under siege, but I am not ready to declare arms

spk_0 control dead either. There's a long negotiating history. And we know that when there are mutual

spk_0 interests between countries, they've been willing to do things. So I would say, you know, I have a

spk_0 colleague at Carnegie Mellon University, Justin Canfield, who's written a lot about anticipatory arms

spk_0 control of emerging tech. And he points to things like the environmental modification convention

spk_0 when countries around the world came together to ban weapons that would essentially control the

spk_0 wetter and hurricanes and things like this and point them at one another because they realized it

spk_0 would be devastating for humanity. So there does need to be some understanding of existential risk

spk_0 about the intersection between AI and nuclear weapons and how these things are devastating because

spk_0 in order to get arms control in particular with emerging tech moving forward, there needs to be a

spk_0 mutual understanding that first mover benefits are in themselves maybe not great because of the

spk_0 risk posed to humanity. Now, the viewpoint is something which was quite worrisome at the beginning

spk_0 of Trump administration. I don't think so. I don't know if it's a policy or it was just electoral

spk_0 rhetoric of, at one point, I think it was Trump or some of his advisors mentioning that's how

spk_0 Korea could get its own nuclear weapon and Japan and others and we don't need to provide that nuclear

spk_0 umbrella or insurance for them. And then it also raised a lot of questions in Europe about the

spk_0 reliability of US nuclear umbrella. Do you think that was a serious policy discourse or it was just

spk_0 electoral rhetoric? So there was two things here. The first thing I would focus on is I just want to

spk_0 immediately go to the South Korean discourse that because of the war in Ukraine and because of North

spk_0 Korea now disgraced President Yoon and South Korea said South Korea needs to develop nuclear weapons.

spk_0 And this rhetoric resulted from the Biden administration of South Korea getting the Washington

spk_0 Declaration which essentially gives South Korea more influence in joint US nuclear planning about

spk_0 the use of nuclear weapons to defend South Korea. And people have said this was dangerous. It showed

spk_0 that South Korea really wanted nuclear weapons. And in my view, this was nuclear populism by the

spk_0 Yoon administration because polls in South Korea have shown for more than a decade that more than 70%

spk_0 of South Koreans want nuclear weapons. I think it's this. I think that for countries around the

spk_0 world, whether it's Poland or South Korea, I don't think that their leaders are really thinking about

spk_0 developing nuclear weapons. I think they like to make threats about developing nuclear weapons

spk_0 because it makes the United States give them firmer assurances and come to their defense.

spk_0 They may eventually run out of luck with the Trump administration. And so here's what I would say.

spk_0 The Trump administration is very dedicated to burden sharing with allies. One need only look at the

spk_0 things President Trump himself has said. Secretary of Defense Pete Higgs said that said. And what

spk_0 Vice President J.D. Vance has said. They've been very clear that they want to reduce US defense spending

spk_0 commitments. And I think this whole new 5% proposal for NATO countries to do 5% of their spending

spk_0 on GDP on the military is part and parcel of this. Although I think a lot of European countries are

spk_0 hoping that the Trump administration will go away and they won't have to spend 5% and the 5%

spk_0 pledge is written so broadly that I think that countries like Spain are probably going to

spk_0 spend money on on highways and hospitals and say that that contributes to the 5% and I understand

spk_0 why they would do this. But I think there's a real serious issue here. And that is that

spk_0 if the Trump administration continues to say we will retrench a few things happen here.

spk_0 One is they could scare their allies and their allies might develop nuclear weapons

spk_0 possibly or other means. And if they do that then the Trump administration will retrench anyway.

spk_0 So the thing that's going to happen here is I think the United States under Trump

spk_0 is going to retrench no matter what. So if allies don't pay enough for their defense

spk_0 the Trump administration is going to retrench. If allies pay quite a bit for their defense

spk_0 the Trump administration is then going to say look at how much money they're spending we're going

spk_0 to retrench. So for me on some level and we'd have to think about the long run what are the

spk_0 direction of US politics. I think that retrenchment is coming and I do think that the Trump

spk_0 administration may not care as much about the norms of the NPT and non-proliferation at least

spk_0 among friendly states as past administrations. Right. One final question on this topic and then

spk_0 meaningfully could fill some of the current void and vacuum which is there in formal arms control

spk_0 and given the fact that it's fragmenting and it's sort of unraveling.

spk_0 So I think of Track 2 diplomacy as an idea incubator and so I do a fair amount of Track 2 and

spk_0 Track 1.5 and I get to talk with my colleagues around the world including from China and Russia

spk_0 policy proposals come up. There's a question though about like what is the line to policy influence

spk_0 and I think that things that American experts in Track 1.5, Track 2 are talking about I'm not sure

spk_0 if they filter up and I think that you know a retired Russian and Chinese generals talking about

spk_0 things I don't know if it's likely to scale up there. So I think that Track 1.5 and Track 2

spk_0 is a great place for experts to pool expertise come up with ideas and then there's a question of

spk_0 does that actually scale up like can we actually get there. I think we can get there as far as many

spk_0 ideas and I think it's also pivotal to keep it going because Track 1 and Track 2 provides lots of

spk_0 ideas that in the future if we're in a position politically to engage in arms control talks

spk_0 thank goodness those ideas will actually be there so I don't think that should stop but I think

spk_0 you know if there's a lack of interest at the top Track 1.5 Track 2 doesn't do a whole lot and

spk_0 either does proposals from for example you know neutral mediators arbiters etc if there's not a

spk_0 whole lot of interest at the top. And are there lessons that could be drawn from whole war

spk_0 mechanisms in terms of managing risks of arms control. So do you see any any specific

spk_0 any top two three lessons that could be drawn? I think that the best lessons that can be drawn

spk_0 from arms control I would say are you know from from my colleague at the Air War College in Alabama

spk_0 from John Maurer who's written a great article in the Texas National Security Review and he now

spk_0 has a book with Yale University Press called the Purposes of Arms Control and in the in his argument

spk_0 about the purposes of arms control he said there are many reasons why state seek arms control and why

spk_0 bureaucracy seek arms control and you can have a situation in which some people in a bureaucracy

spk_0 are in a state seek arms control because they want disarmament some wants stability and others

spk_0 just want to eliminate systems that they think they have a level of inferiority on compared to

spk_0 their adversary so it's about on some level achieving superiority and so you can have heterogeneous

spk_0 interest within a state and heterogeneous interest between states coming to the bargaining table

spk_0 and you can still fundamentally get to an agreement to reduce dangers at some level. And I think

spk_0 that that's the point that we ought to think about is there are many paths up the mountain and

spk_0 there are many reasons why countries can engage in arms control and and and kind of how we can get

spk_0 there. I mean fundamentally at the end of the day though I would say this and this is a controversial

spk_0 topic but I'll say it anyway I think that in the US context the biggest hope for nuclear arms

spk_0 control and disarmament that the United States has seen in decades is Donald Trump and people are

spk_0 skeptical of that because they think that Trump is pro-nuclear and everything else. President

spk_0 Trump in this country has been very clear that he thinks that nuclear weapons are the biggest

spk_0 danger in the world and he said it many times and I genuinely believe that President Donald Trump

spk_0 has a fear of nuclear weapons and in the United States we've oftentimes had difficulty getting

spk_0 to nuclear arms control with Russia and heaven forbid maybe in the future China even though there

spk_0 obstacles on the Chinese end because it's difficult for a democratic president to get a treaty

spk_0 through the US Senate because of Republican objections. I think that if Donald Trump was able to

spk_0 pursue arms control which was leader centric of his own making with Russia, with Putin I think that

spk_0 Donald Trump would get support among Republicans overwhelmingly to do things which were not possible

spk_0 and Donald Trump also wants to win a Nobel Peace Prize and I take that seriously so this may

spk_0 people may find this to be very strange but I think that Donald Trump is one of the best hopes

spk_0 that the United States and the world has had for reducing nuclear risk for a very long time and I

spk_0 think that there's this fear among people who are in the arms control disarmament community that

spk_0 they object to a lot of Trump's domestic policies particularly on immigration, on military spending

spk_0 on transparency so they're not willing to play ball and think about the things the Trump

spk_0 administration could do on disarmament and I would say that may be a little bit myopic and shallow

spk_0 because I think that Donald Trump may be able to do more in the serena than pass leaders that we've

spk_0 seen should he so want to. Yes I indeed agree with you I totally agree with you in terms of

spk_0 the Nobel Peace Prize which could drive Donald Trump to do anything for it. I think

spk_0 well and above and beyond the enter a state peacemaking that he's engaged in we could probably

spk_0 sort of get him to do some of these arms control treaties and that could

spk_0 give him a Nobel Peace Prize but we are now moving into the last section of the podcast and I do

spk_0 have to ask you one or two or three questions on the emerging technologies and how would it tell

spk_0 the strategic balance and the strategic you know this course. I mean I've been reading a lot about

spk_0 that the United States need to throw another Manhattan project after AI or US and the West needs

spk_0 another Apollo program because it's going to be the last invention of humans and everything should

spk_0 be thrown at it but I wanted to take you to basically get your take on how advancements in

spk_0 these emerging technology particularly AI I don't know missile defense we're hearing about this

spk_0 new golden doom in a program at hypersonic you know missiles etc affecting the Terrence,

spk_0 nuclear deterrence what's your take on. So this is a really complicated kind of spate of things so

spk_0 I will get to the easy ones and then get to the hard one. So hypersonic weapons I feel like

spk_0 are really not that different from existing capabilities in that intercontinental ballistic

spk_0 missiles already travel at hypersonic speeds. I feel like hypersonic weapons are what we'd call

spk_0 a kind of press released weapon and that they may or be a lot of hype to them and I think they're

spk_0 the type of capability that for example the Russian Federation would like to have because they show

spk_0 that they can't be intercepted by missile defense which Russia is really scared of. A lot of these

spk_0 Russian capabilities like you know nuclear powered cruise missile of allegedly you know unlimited

spk_0 range you know underwater nuclear armed drones and things like that I feel like these weapons exist

spk_0 because the Russian Federation wants to show that it has capabilities which cannot be intercepted

spk_0 by US ballistic missile defense and that they could trade these off. So moving on to missile

spk_0 defense if someone can solve the missile defense problem it would be really interesting for the world.

spk_0 The Israelis have you know iron dome which is nothing to do with ballistic missile defense it's

spk_0 for intercepting primitive rockets which are coming over and you know ballistic missiles travel so

spk_0 much faster so much more precise and even Israel with its massive ballistic even with its

spk_0 missile defense capabilities still has like more than 10% of Iranian missiles landing on its cities

spk_0 and Iranian missiles are nothing compared to Russian and Chinese missiles the thing about

spk_0 ballistic missile defense is ballistic missile defense has been controversial for such a long period

spk_0 of time and so why we had the inter the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972 because it's believed

spk_0 that successful ballistic missile defense could undermine mutual vulnerability which is necessary

spk_0 for nuclear deterrence and Russia is worried about these US capabilities which is why they're developing

spk_0 all these technologies I said about before is essentially asymmetric responses to ballistic missile

spk_0 defense. I think that ballistic missile defense in the US context has never really been tested

spk_0 under ideal conditions it's not been tested against systems that have decoys etc it costs more to

spk_0 intercept the weapon than it costs to do it it's supremely expensive and the physics are difficult

spk_0 and in the atomic backfires book that I mentioned my colleagues Sarah Bidgood has has a chapter

spk_0 about how this can backfire I think it's tough and I don't think we're going to solve the

spk_0 missile defense physics anytime soon but the thing about it is this in Washington mutual vulnerability

spk_0 is anathema in Russia China and autocracies you can have mutual vulnerabilities and talk about

spk_0 deterrence in democracies where public opinion matters it's really difficult to talk about mutual

spk_0 vulnerability and not making investments to defend your people so I think we're going to continue

spk_0 to see missile defense be particularly destabilizing to arms control and lead to asymmetric responses

spk_0 and arms racing even though it doesn't work just because in democracies we need to talk about

spk_0 missile defense because of the political benefits of doing so now artificial intelligence this is

spk_0 the really really really tricky one this is an exponentially expanding technology in 2023 artificial

spk_0 intelligence was doing essentially undergrad level math and physics right now it's doing PhD level

spk_0 math and physics and it's only going to get better and it's general purpose tech and the technologies

spk_0 that we're training to do clerical and secretarial work also wind up helping you with a lot of the

spk_0 things that you could do in the nuclear weapons domain and let me just give you a scenario that I

spk_0 think matters and it's artificial intelligence and the so-called kill chain the process from

spk_0 right selecting a target until the target is dead or destroyed let's say that today we think about

spk_0 the kill chain and let's think about a war between China and the United States that war planning

spk_0 involves thousands of individuals making war plans thinking about decisions communicating coordinating

spk_0 if you can effectively program AI at the theater level to do essentially net centric

spk_0 battlefield management you may result in this so let's say the United States in a conflict with China

spk_0 launches an ICBM against a Chinese missile silo that weapon is not delivered it's destroyed whether

spk_0 through a Chinese intercept rather through you know Fratricide from a previously existing a cloud

spk_0 destroys the missile coming in etc in the real world now today before battle management net centric

spk_0 warfare with AI doing a lot of the decision making you'd say all right that missile missed

spk_0 what do we do now is there an off ramp here you know should we think about something else can we

spk_0 reassign the target if AI has control on some level over the kill chain and doing this really

spk_0 AI could say all right that ICBM has been destroyed let's seamlessly in real time give that target

spk_0 to a ballistic missile submarine off the coast of China and that can be done in a matter of seconds

spk_0 or minutes immediately in order to optimize warfare to increase a military's lethality and what

spk_0 you've just done is you've just compressed decision making timelines in order to make a military

spk_0 more lethal now here's the thing about this we all are all talking about like declarations to

spk_0 keep a human in the loop controlling AI etc this technology is already being developed because it

spk_0 makes militaries more lethal and countries are going to develop it no matter what so thinking

spk_0 about guard rail thinking about agreements to keep it out of the nuclear domain matters a lot

spk_0 and what also matters is we talk about AI as far as keeping a human in the loop on the loop

spk_0 monitoring and where the human can you know the end of the day make the decision or you know the

spk_0 terminator syndrome out of the loop and we all like to think about like in the loop and like what

spk_0 does it mean to have a human in the loop with nuclear AI but if AI is integrated into our command

spk_0 control and communications if it's integrated into our ISR we may eventually grow to think that a

spk_0 human is in the loop but the loop is actually constructed by AI giving intelligence assessments in

spk_0 real time or near real time to humans and presenting them with confidence so that the human feels like

spk_0 they're making the decision but the loop is presented in such a way with confidence by AI that the

spk_0 human is either on or out of the loop and I find this concerning because all of these investments

spk_0 are simultaneously happening now because they make militaries more lethal. Final question

spk_0 that was fascinating I was saying but with final question do you see that AI another autonomous

spk_0 system will lower the threshold for nuclear use and in that context adding on is there is co-force

spk_0 sort of tech-focused arms control treaties or agreements? So the answer to both of the questions

spk_0 is yes and so I would say that autonomous systems are something else which we could talk about

spk_0 imagine and so imagine that you're able to program right information using AI other things

spk_0 and you're able to put it on to a platform which is what AI enables you to do enables you to

spk_0 essentially mirror systems imagine if you wanted to destroy a country's ballistic missile silos

spk_0 and you could then transfer the system and its upgrades to a thousand or a million drones simultaneously.

spk_0 This is a whole scaling up of capabilities that we haven't seen before this whole mirroring

spk_0 and I think that that lowers the threshold for dangers and I think all the things I just

spk_0 talked about before about compressing decision-making timelines about the construction of the loop by AI

spk_0 I think as well makes nuclear weapons use more likely and I think we're getting there and I think it's

spk_0 getting substantially more dangerous and what I said earlier about AI potentially helping countries

spk_0 overcome tacit knowledge barriers to the bomb meaning that we may have more countries with more

spk_0 nuclear weapons which again probably makes nuclear weapons use more likely in the future and I think

spk_0 that's a real thing so I think there of course are reasons why we should be doing this and people

spk_0 have talked about again you know clubs and cartels related to the supply they've talked about

spk_0 you know the United States and China coming together and realizing that you know first mover

spk_0 advantage is not useful there's been talk about revitalizing the nuclear non-proliferation

spk_0 treated have subsidiary bodies that talk about the incorporation of artificial intelligence

spk_0 and to nuclear decision-making so we have global dialogue about it there's been talk about

spk_0 reviving zombie institutions like the conference on disarmament which has been you know in disarray

spk_0 since since uh been disarray since the late 90s because of lack of progress on controlling

spk_0 fissile materials and getting them to talk about AI so we have existing institutions we have

spk_0 existing bodies the imperatives are clear we have decades in fact generations of work on

spk_0 arms control we have the thought about suppliers clubs and other things and there are really some

spk_0 barriers to overcome here and the barriers to overcome are realizing that this is an existential

spk_0 risk particularly when integrated with nuclear weapons and that the first mover advantage

spk_0 might not be worth it given the consequences that may come down the line so I think that's one

spk_0 and the other is being able to think about dual use tech this stuff is you know we have in the

spk_0 United States what I call the you know the the blue-haired coder problem the blue-haired coder

spk_0 is a dude or woman due debt who works in Silicon Valley and works on is a super smart brilliant

spk_0 coder who's doing the most amazing work in the world to develop a grocery delivery app and they

spk_0 don't realize that it has dual use applications it could be used in the WMD domain and maybe they

spk_0 have foreign direct investment from a firm based in Hong Kong for example into their innovation

spk_0 and China's military civil fusion program is going to exploit the developments of their grocery

spk_0 delivery app to use it in its military and nuclear logistics and so we need a lot of awareness

spk_0 we need a lot of thinking and the other thing that we really need in a way that we haven't seen

spk_0 before and I want to say this because it matters a lot in the past arms control that happened is

spk_0 governments with support from their national labs because innovation on nuclear weapons was

spk_0 done by governments in the military and then trickled down and there are so many other developments

spk_0 that trickled down the innovation pyramid the internet cell phones other things this is now changing

spk_0 innovation is now happening in labs of tech firms it's happening in startup garages and it is

spk_0 trickling up the pyramid rather than coming down the pyramid which means that if we want to do

spk_0 viable arms control in the future there needs to be a lot of collaboration with the tech sector

spk_0 who actually needs to be sitting at the table for arms control or educated in such a way

spk_0 that we have not seen before so the next generation of tech innovation I think requires

spk_0 essentially a rethinking of the relationship between private sector and the military both to

spk_0 harness technology for military benefits and to control it so it doesn't get out of hand

spk_0 Professor Dr. Stephen Herzog thank you so much for such a comprehensive and insightful

spk_0 discussion we covered a wide range of ground from states of nuclear and nonproreforestation

spk_0 treaty to the impact of emerging technologies the challenges of missile defense and implications

spk_0 of Ukraine conflict your perspectives have added real value and depth to the episode so we

spk_0 truly appreciate you sharing your expertise and research with us and we also look forward to the

spk_0 release of your upcoming book atomic backfires when nuclear policies fail later this year thank you

spk_0 so much thank you so much for having me I really appreciated being here and I enjoyed our

spk_0 conversation thank you

Episode 8. Atomic Backfires in a New Nuclear Age: Dr. Stephen Herzog on a Crumbling Nuclear Order, Missile Shields, New Wars and Old Bombs

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